The Polish WW2 success in breaking the code of the German Enigma machine

5. Polish decrypting effort 1939-1945

Germany invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939 and on September 3rd, 1939 France and Britain declared war on Germany. Neither France nor Britain followed up with any military action to help Poland against Germany. By September 6th the German army was moving steadily into Poland and the Polish cryptology unit was ordered to evacuate from their Pyry Forest location to Romania. Due to continuous bombing the evacuation was very slow. However, the massive influx of military and civilians into Romania helped the Polish cryptologists to slip past Romanian intelligence and reach Bucharest quickly. Since no prior arrangements were made, their contacts with the French and British intelligence had to be made in total secrecy. Romania, at that time, was a passive ally of Germany and Bucharest was full of German spies trying to intercept important Polish nationals. Contact with the British did not bring any results but the French contacted Captain G. Bertrand, who made arrangements for their transportation to France. M. Rejewski, J. Rozycki and H. Zygalski arrived in France by the end of September and were quickly followed by Colonel G. Langer and Major M. Ciezki. The rest of the team had to take their turn but most of them arrived in France by May 1940.

Following military agreement between the French and Polish (now located in France) governments, an intelligence unit was formed in the small town of Gretz-Armainvillers 40 kilometres southeast of Paris. The unit, housed in the Chateau de Vignoles, was in operation by the end of October 1939 and was fully manned by May 1940. The unit was given the code name of "BRUNO". While the security, administration, logistics and radio interception were provided by the French, message decryption was wholly provided by the Poles.

As of 12 May 1940, the Bruno Organization consisted of the following

Commanding Officer Cmdr G. Bertrand
(French - centre)

Deputy CO Col G. Langer
(Polish - left)

Capt K. MacFarlane UK Liaison Officer
(British - right)

GERMAN SECTION	RUSSIAN SECTION
In charge Commandant Renard (F) Deputy Captain Ciezki (P),	In charge Captain Couey (F) Deputy Major M. Chasles (F)
Radio Interception E.Fokczynski (P) Lieutenant Annequin (F) L. Siedenmeyer (F)	Radio Interception Lieutenant Palluth (P) Captain Mariele (F) Captain Chadapaux (F) Sargent Eclancher (F)
Mechanical Decryption M. Rejewski (P) Lieutenant Palluth (P) J. Rozycki (P) H. Zygalski (P) K. Graca (P) S. Palluth (P) T. Paszkowski (P) U. Krajewski (P) Captain Larcher (F) Captain Braquenie (F)	Mechanical Decryption Captain J. Gralinski (P) Lieutenant Szachno (P) Smolenski (P)

The composition of "Bruno" changed continuously as more Polish intelligence personnel reached France and more French personnel were allocated. During the "Funny War" before Germany attacked France, the French dug in at the Maginot Line and waited. This did not apply to the "Bruno" operation, which was gathering information on German Army strength and locations.

Round the clock operation was wearing both on the three existing Enigma machines and the cryptologists. To speed up the decryption and to reduce the enormous load on the cryptologists, 40 Enigma machines were ordered from a French company. A full set of drawings and one Enigma machine were supplied to facilitate a quick response but, up to May 1940 and the fall of France, very few machines were delivered. It was much later, in Vichy France, that the Poles were able to fabricate and assemble four additional machines.

To make the Enigma code more unbreakable, the Germans made several changes and improvements which slowed the decryption process. "Bruno" worked on three shifts with the cryptologists being called at any time of day or night. The "Funny War" ended when, on May 10th, 1940, Germany attacked Belgium, Holland and the Netherlands. In the ensuing thrust, which bypassed the Maginot Line, French resistance collapsed after several weeks of fighting. From the very beginning the Poles had wanted to cooperate with the British who had enormous resources and, being removed from contact with the enemy, could make better use of Enigma generated intelligence information. However, Capt. G. Bertrand insisted that the operation be under his control and that all outside communication be only through him, forbidding the Poles to communicate directly with authorities in London. This antagonistic attitude of the French towards the British was detrimental to successful operation as the British were providing H. Zygalski perforated sheets and the Enigma keys. The worst Polish misgivings were realised when the French resistance collapsed and they found themselves helpless in occupied France. Worst of all, the French in their incompetence bungled the only chance of evacuation in a British ship by failing to provide transportation to the rendezvous point on the Mediterranean coast. This was against all the rules of intelligence operation that you never allow intelligence personnel to be exposed to the enemy since it puts the whole operation in jeopardy. The resulting capture of the key personnel threatened the security of the Enigma secret and it was only luck and the superhuman determination of the captured personnel that kept the secret intact.

On June 17th, 1940 Marshal H. Petain signed the capitulation which effectively terminated the official operation of Bruno. Facing the threat of being captured the British liaison officer, Captain MacFarland, hastily departed to Britain. The Polish contingent of the "Bruno" unit was to be transported by the French on June 22nd, 1940 to a port for evacuation on a British naval vessel. However, in the ensuing chaos and collapse of the government structure, the French failed to transport them and the ship sailed without them! After the French capitulation, "Bruno" was evacuated first to La Ferte-Saint Aubin and then to Vensat and they were able to continue their work at each place. On June 23rd, 1940, in the resulting general chaos, Capt. G. Bertrand managed to transport 22 key personnel by air to Algeria and by June 28th, 1940 they had established radio contact with London. The magnitude of the defeat roused many patriotic French officers and on July 8th, 1940 Capt. G. Bertrand proposed an underground operation in Vichy France. The plan was accepted by the French Gen. M. Weygand and the Polish Gen. W. Sikorski in London. The decrypted messages were now to be sent directly to London.

On October 1st, 1940 "Cadix" started clandestine operation. Security was of utmost importance and to that end each group worked separately, any sharing of information being strictly forbidden. The responsibility of German radio interception was, of course, given to the French team. Also, Capt. G. Bertrand had secret contact with "Vichy" controlled radio intercept units which supplied them with a large number of intercepted messages. In addition, the Poles had installed four of their own receivers to intercept German short wave transmissions. A very important part of Bruno activity was the detection of German spy radio networks in France. Over a period of several months they were able to intercept and decrypt 387 messages, resulting in the elimination of several intelligence and fifth column networks.

The intercepted traffic consisted of messages from:

a) German high command
b) Police in occupied territories
c) German agents in France and North Africa
d) German occupation units in France and North Africa.

To facilitate the movement of couriers between other radio listening posts, as well as French underground units, a fictitious company was formed with subsidiaries in various parts of France and north Africa. Apart from regular Enigma related decryptions, the Polish team managed to break the codes of other German agencies:

a) Messages directing SS and Wehrmacht units in action against French resistance, which enabled Capt. G. Bertrand to warn French Resistance about impending German actions.

b) Intercepts of messages between German spies located in French Mediterranean ports and headquarters. By correlating messages with the ports, French resistance was able to detect transmission locations and apprehend the spies.

c) Telegraph code used by German units that were tracking and vectoring on French underground radio stations.

Early warnings saved many radio stations and lives. This was of the utmost importance because radio was the fastest and most reliable communication with England. By listening to a large number of messages they were able to establish a library of terms used to give special meanings or information to the decoded text. Of special interest, in the fall of 1941, was the breaking of the Swiss "Confederation Helvetica" code. Since the Swiss were using Enigma machines they had to be warned (indirectly in case German spies planted in the Swiss army were listening) that the Germans were decrypting their messages and, again without arousing any suspicions, that the Enigma code could be broken. Life in the villa was very difficult and stressful - cramped quarters, long working hours, hot and humid tropical climate, mosquitoes and scorpions in abundance. Very rare and indirect communications with families in Poland, rare excursions outside the villa and the continuous threat of being discovered had a bad effect on morale. A depressing event occurred on January 9th, 1942 when "Cadix" members J. Rozycki, Capt. J. Gralinski, P. Smolenski and Captain F. Lane went down with the ship Lamoriciere in a storm when returning from Algiers.

By the summer of 1942 the situation was becoming dangerous. The Germans were increasing the number of troops on the border between occupied and "Vichy" France, which was only 250 kilometres from Marseilles. Through a bribed German diplomat, Capt. G. Bertrand discovered a German plan to move two motorised divisions rapidly towards Marseilles in the event of an Allied invasion of North Africa. On the 25th September, 1942 Capt. G. Bertrand, through his contacts, found that German counterintelligence units equipped with direction finding equipment were vectoring on underground transmitters. Having found themselves in the unenviable situation of possibly being captured and tortured by the Germans, the Poles contacted authorities in London for consultation and directives.

Four options were considered:

If the French resisted the German advance, to stay in France
If the French did not resist, to try to evacuate to Africa
If they could not evacuate to a "safe" location in Africa, to try to enter neutral Switzerland.
If they could not enter Switzerland, to try to escape through Spain and Portugal for evacuation to the safety of England

The French did not resist the Germans and evacuation to Africa was not a viable option because of the presence of German and Italian troops and the fluid military situation. Evacuation to neutral Switzerland fell through because the Swiss authorities insisted on them leaving Switzerland. The only option left was the dangerous and uncertain route through Spain and Portugal. In the meantime a message came from London ordering the evacuation of "Cadix". "Cadix" went on an emergency status when mobile vectoring units appeared near Uzes. Within several hours "Cadix" stopped operation and everybody was evacuated to a place on the Mediterranean coast.

In the two years of operation, the Polish "Cadix" unit decrypted 4679 German messages which contained information relating to:

Location of various Wehrmacht units and command posts
Activity of SS and Agents
Operation of the Luftwaffe in Greece and Yugoslavia
Extermination camps in occupied Europe and Russia
German spies

The "Cadix" group was split into small groups of two or three to facilitate movement and to reduce the risk of arrest. M. Rejewski and H. Zygalski were moved from place to place until arrangements could be made for them to be transported across the border to Spain. On the 29h January 1943 they crossed the border with a guide but were arrested, like many others, by the Spanish border patrol. They were taken to an internment camp for interrogation and then to various camps. The living conditions were extremely harsh and it was only after a hunger strike and protests from Polish, British and International Red Cross representatives that they were released. Arrangements were then made to move them to various rented villas around Madrid.

Throughout the war there were underground organizations in occupied Europe that specialised in transporting information and people to England. Priority was given to those with special qualifications and expertise that were in short supply in England. M. Rejewski, H. Zygalski and three radio operators crossed the border into Portugal, from where they were transported to Gibraltar by a clandestine fishing vessel. On July 30th, 1943, they were air lifted from Gibraltar to England. Upon their arrival in England they were thoroughly interrogated and debriefed by a counter intelligence unit. Polish military high command made it quite clear to them that even counter intelligence should not learn about their Enigma work. They were assigned to the Communication Unit of the Polish Supreme Command at Boxmoor. For reasons known only to the British, the British Intelligence Officers who had been briefed by M.Rejewski and H. Zygalski in Warsaw in 1939 and who had received the Polish made Enigma machine never contacted them and they were never allowed to contact the British unit. M. Rejewski, H. Zygalski and three others were the only members of "Cadix" who were able to escape from occupied France to the safety of England. Col. G. Langer, Maj. M. Ciezki, S. Palluth, E. Fokczynski and K. Graca were captured by Gestapo. Col. G. Langer and Mjr. M. Ciezki were sent to a concentration camp at SS Souderkommand Schloss Eisenberg. They were liberated in Karlsbad by the American 1st Division on May 10th, 1945 after two years of internment, just before Soviet troops moved into the town. Palluth, Fokczynski and Graca were sent to a concentration camp in Oranienburg. Graca survived but Palluth died in an air raid and Fokczynski died of malnutrition. Though brutally treated, none of the men divulged their secret and did not compromise the fact that the Enigma code was broken - which would have had a disastrous effect on the Allied war effort. Winston Churchill's famous speech referred to the few who defended Britain but it applied even more to those members of the Polish cryptology team. Col. Bertrand stayed in France and was arrested in Paris in the church of Sacre Coeur while waiting for a courier from London. To save himself he agreed to cooperate with the Germans but he gave only the names of agents who were either in hiding or out of the country and, once released, set up a meeting with a British agent. This could have ended in a real disaster for the Allies.

In the meantime, in Britain Gen. Menzies realized that if Capt. Bertrand had told the Germans that the Enigma code was broken the invasion of the Continent would be jeopardised and the Germans could use Enigma to deceive the Allies. Arrangements were made to contact him and he was flown to Britain on the 2nd June, just a few days before the invasion. During the interrogation it was concluded that though Capt. Bertrand did not betray the Enigma secret he tried several times to find out when and where the Allies were to land and asked that this information be relayed via radio to France. This was in spite of the fact that the radios in France could have easily been taken over by the Germans. On that basis it was decided that it would be very prudent to keep Capt. Bertrand under house confinement until after the Allied landing on the Normandy beaches. Invasion of the Continent began early in the morning of 6th June 1944.


Polish & Spanish members of Cadix	Jan Gralinski, Jerzy Rozycki and Piotr Smolenski who drowned in the ship Lamonciere in January 1942	Chateau de Foozes

Breaking the Enigma code Polish contribution to victory

Breaking the Enigma code
Polish contribution to victory