Andrzej Dabrowa, Ph.D.
8. United States in the secret war
Between WW1 and WW2 the United States had no unified intelligence information
distribution. The intercepted messages were scattered between a number of
organizations and though some travelled through rapid channels of
communication, some were diverted by technical or procedural delays and some
never reached a centre of decision. By the end of the twenties, the US
cryptoanalysis unit, named "Black Chamber", was running into trouble
and could not break new codes. In May 1928 they ordered a single commercial
version of the Enigma machine. Their effort was stopped by the Secretary of
State, H. L. Stimson, on the principle that "gentlemen do not read each
other's mail". Like a true man of honour he disbanded the "Black
Chamber" but, luckily, it survived in another department.
In 1940 the USA and Britain started exchanging scientific intelligence
information. The USA gave Britain information on the Japanese Purple code and
Britain gave the USA information on the German Enigma code. In addition, four
Americans (A. Simkov, L. Rosen, P. Currier and R. Weeks) were sent for a 5-week
study at Bletchley Park. In April 1942, a conference held in Washington led to
ever increasing cooperation and both US and British intelligence regularly
exchanged secret information. Both the US President, F. D. Roosevelt, and Gen.
D. D. Eisenhower were briefed on the benefits and the security responsibilities
of ULTRA secret. US commanders were brought on board and US Army units were
installed at Bletchley Park to perform interception, operate "Bombes"
and to perform cryptoanalysis with major interest in the German U-boat code.
The American contingent was more than 200 strong.
In September 1943 an Anglo-American agreement incorporated US personnel into
the British structure. In spite of that, many US generals such as G. S. Patton,
C. Spaatz, and I. Eaker did not have faith in the value of Ultra intelligence.
One example of that was a tragic event on 14th October 1943 when 291 planes of
the US Air Force raided heavily defended Schweinfurt and suffered very heavy
casualties! This loss was due to the refusal of Gen. Eaker to take into account
the strength of the German Fighter Force as predicted by Enigma intercepts. In
the Battle of the Atlantic the situation was different. Throughout 1942 no
Naval Enigma messages were decrypted and shipping losses were staggering. In
1942 the US Navy had no Operational Intelligence Centre and, on a British
initiative, the US Navy established Atlantic Operations Intelligence. Close
cooperation was assured by direct connection between the US and British
Tracking Rooms. This permitted coordinated monitoring of German U-boat
locations, planning of convoy routes and efficient disposition of Allied Strike
Forces.
In December 1942 the German Naval Triton code was broken and shipping
losses were dramatically reduced! In parallel with successful Atlantic
Operations Intelligence, the US Army established its own Special Branch under
the command of the Military Intelligence Service Chief, Brigadier General M. W.
Clark. Until 1943 the cooperation was somewhat haphazard but it reached its
peak in preparation for the invasion of the Continent. Since US commanders,
unlike the British, had no experience of using Ultra, Gen. G. Marshall sent a
letter to Gen. D. D. Eisenhower chartering the use of Ultra and the authority
of Liaison Officers: "Their primary responsibility will be to evaluate
Ultra intelligence, present it in usable form to the Commanding Officer and to
such of his officers as are authorised Ultra recipients, assist in fusing Ultra
with intelligence derived from other sources, and give advice in connection
with Ultra intelligence in such fashion that the security of the source is not
endangered."
Although the British shared all their Ultra secrets with the US they had
reservations about whether junior Liaison Officers could persuade independent
US Generals to operate by the book. The evaluation and distribution of Ultra
information in the USA was vastly different from British practice. At the
beginning of the war, the British fighting in the Battle of Britain and in the
Atlantic, were interested mainly in immediate results in the fight against
overwhelming enemy forces. The United States, separated from Europe by the vast
space of the Atlantic Ocean, were more interested in planning ahead with
massive transfers of troops, armament and supplies to Britain and then to
Europe. In July 1943 a Special Branch section was set up which published daily
reports. Initially these reports were sent to the Secretary of War,
Chief-of-Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations and Planning
Departments. Later the list was expanded to include Admiral W. D. Leahy,
Roosevelt's Chief of Staff , and Admiral E. King - Commander in Chief of the US
Fleet. Ultra information was used to the limit in preparing for the invasion of
the Continent.
(c) 2003 A R Dabrowa